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MS defense: Internal Penetration Test of a Simulated Automotive Ethernet Environment, 11/21

MS defense: Internal Penetration Test of a Simulated Automotive Ethernet Environment, 11/21

Tim Finin, 11:42pm 18 November 2017

M.S. Thesis Defense

Internal Penetration Test of a Simulated Automotive Ethernet Environment

Kenneth Owen Truex

11:15 Tuesday, 21 November 2017, ITE325, UMBC

The capabilities of modern day automobiles have far exceeded what Robert Bosch GmbH could have imagined when it proposed the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus back in 1986. Over time, drivers wanted more functionality, comfort, and safety in their automobiles — creating a burden for automotive manufacturers. With these driver demands came many innovations to the in-vehicle network core protocol. Modern automobiles that have a video based infotainment system or any type of camera assisted functionality such as an Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) use ethernet as their network backbone. This is because the original CAN specification only allowed for up to 8 bytes of data per message on a bus rated at 1 Mbps. This is far less than the requirements of more advanced video-based automotive systems. The ethernet protocol allows for 1500 bytes of data per packet on a network rated for up to 100 Mbps. This led the automotive industry to adopt ethernet as the core protocol, overcoming most of the limitations posed by the CAN protocol. By adopting ethernet as the protocol for automotive networks, certain attack vectors are now available for black hat hackers to exploit in order to put the vehicle in an unsafe condition. I will create a simulated automotive ethernet environment using the CANoe network simulation platform by Vector GmbH. Then, a penetration test will be conducted on the simulated environment in order to discover attacks that pose a threat to automotive ethernet networks. These attacks will strictly follow a comprehensive threat model in order to narrowly focus the attack surface. If exploited successfully, these attacks will cover all three sides of the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) triad.

I will then propose a new and innovative mitigation strategy that can be implemented on current industry standard ECUs and run successfully under strict time and resource limitations. This new strategy can help to limit the attack surface that exists on modern day automobiles and help to protect the vehicle and its occupants from malicious adversaries.

Committee: Drs. Anupam Joshi (chair), Richard Forno, Charles Nicholas, Nilanjan Banerjee


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