Bi-level Modelling of False Data Injection Attacks on Security Constrained Optimal Power FlowTweet
Journal: IET Generation, Transmission and Distribution
Date: June 12, 2017
Abstract: Conventional power system was originally designed to provide efficient and reliable power. With the integration of information technology and advanced metering infrastructure, the power grid has become smart. The smart meters have allowed the system operators to continuously monitor the power system in real time and take necessary action to avoid system failures. Malicious actor, with access to the smart meters can modify sensor measurements to disrupt the operation of power system. To make the power system resilient to such cyber-attacks, it is important to study all possible outcomes of cyber-intrusions. In this paper, we present an attack on security constrained optimum power flow. We show with the help of case studies how an attacker, by injecting false data in load measurement sensors, can force system operator to change the dispatch and hence make the power system N–1 in-compliant. The attack is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem, aiming to find the minimum set of sensors required to launch the attack. From the system operator's perspective, critical lines and critical generators vulnerable to false data injection (FDI) attack are identified. IEEE 14 bus and 30 bus test systems are used to test the vulnerability of the power system against FDI attacks.
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