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	<pub:InProceedings rdf:about="http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/paper/html/id/807/Secure-Power-Trading-in-Cooperative-Relay-Network-With-Asymmetric-Cournot-Duopoly-Model">
		<rdfs:label><![CDATA[Secure Power Trading in Cooperative Relay Network With Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly Model]]></rdfs:label>
		<pub:title><![CDATA[Secure Power Trading in Cooperative Relay Network With Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly Model]]></pub:title>
		<pub:publishedOn rdf:datatype="&xsd;dateTime">2017-05-31T00:00:00-05:00</pub:publishedOn>
		<pub:abstract><![CDATA[Abstract—In this paper, we consider a source, which communicates to destination, with cooperation of a relay node. An eavesdropper is tapping the second hop, when all the links undergo Rayleigh fading. Relay nodes are the market players, who compete to trade their power to source in order to maximize their incentives. We evaluate the secrecy outage probability of a dual-hop decode-and-forward (DF) threshold- based cooperative relay network. Without assuming that all the relays can always perfectly decode, here we consider that only those relays who satisfy predetermined threshold, can correctly decode the message. We evaluate the utility of relays for both linear/non-linear and static/dynamic Cournot duopoly asymmetric model. We have shown that increase in channel gain from relay to eavesdropper, decreases the profit of relays and can have a dramatic effect on the Nash outcome.
]]></pub:abstract>
		<pub:counter>1148</pub:counter>
		<pub:tag><![CDATA[cournot game; decode-forward relay; outage prob-
ability; nash equilibrium; threshold-based]]></pub:tag>
		<pub:booktitle><![CDATA[12th Annual Symposium On Information Assurance (ASIA’17)]]></pub:booktitle>
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					<person:Person rdf:about="http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/person/html/Anupam/Joshi"><person:name><![CDATA[Anupam Joshi]]></person:name><rdfs:label><![CDATA[Anupam Joshi]]></rdfs:label></person:Person>
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							<person:Person rdf:about="http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/person/html/Ranjan/Bose"><person:name><![CDATA[Ranjan Bose]]></person:name><rdfs:label><![CDATA[Ranjan Bose]]></rdfs:label></person:Person>
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									<person:Person rdf:about="http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/person/html/Khyati/Chopra"><person:name><![CDATA[Khyati Chopra]]></person:name><rdfs:label><![CDATA[Khyati Chopra]]></rdfs:label></person:Person>
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<person:Person rdf:about="http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/person/html/Anupam/Joshi"><person:name><![CDATA[Anupam Joshi]]></person:name><rdfs:label><![CDATA[Anupam Joshi]]></rdfs:label></person:Person>
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