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 <item rdf:about="http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/paper/html/id/805/Duopoly-Models-for-Power-Trading-in-Secure-Cooperative-Relay-Networks">
  <title><![CDATA[Duopoly Models for Power Trading in Secure Cooperative Relay Networks]]></title>
  <link>http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/paper/html/id/805/Duopoly-Models-for-Power-Trading-in-Secure-Cooperative-Relay-Networks</link>
  <description><![CDATA[In this paper we consider a source, in-need of cooperation of a relay due to limited battery power to communicate with the destination, with an eavesdropper tapping the second hop, when all the links undergo Rayleigh fading. Relay nodes are the market players, who compete to trade their power to source in order to maximize their incentives. Asymptotic analysis of the intercept probability is presented when source-relay and relay-destination average SNRs are the same or different. We evaluate ...]]></description>
  <dc:date>2016-02-29</dc:date>
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